accounting代写,专业代写accounting assignment

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  • accounting代写,专业代写accounting assignment
    Our approach here is to understand rules and regulation as consequences of
    specific psychological biases or social processes, rather than a generalized lack
    of sophistication on the part of market players. Experimental accounting research
    often identifies specific investor biases and proposes policies to address these
    biases. In much accounting research, however, psychological effects are often only
    implicitly recognized by referring to "unsophisticated" investors or "costs" of
    processing public information. Direct consideration of psychological forces is
    important because it ensures that the assumptions made about investor behavior
    agree with the scientific evidence about how people actually behave.^
    In empirical capital markets research, attributing a proposed market ineffi-
    ciency to some generalized "lack of sophistication" of investors seems like only a
    modest step toward explanation. There is a large body of evidence and theory from
    psychology, economics, and finance about different types of biases or limitations
    that investors are subject to, such as limited attention, overconfidence, and emo-
    tional decision making. As a result, a growing empirical literature in finance tests
    specific psychological hypotheses, such as the effects on asset prices of reduced
    attention (e.g., DeliaVigna and Pollet 2009), distracting effects of competing news
    (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009), and feelings (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003;
    Edmans, Garcia, and Norli 2007) on asset prices.accounting代写,专业代写accounting assignment
    Similarly, behavioral models of capital market prices in economics, finance,
    and to some extent in accounting have, in recent years, focused on the effects of
    specific types of erroneous judgment or decision-making processes. Examples
    include hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Laibson 1997), prospect theory (e.g., Barberis,
    Huang, and Santos 2001), overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
    1998; Scheinkman and Xiong 2003), and limited attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh
    2003). Although some of the pioneering research in behavioral finance exploited
    CAR Vol . 26 No. 4 (Winter 2009)The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure 1069
    the modeling device of noise traders whose behavior is mechanically specified
    (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman 1990), in the last decade the trend has
    been toward endogenous investor decisions and basing assumptions about investor
    behavior on evidence from psychology about how people think and decide.
    Good rules for bad usersaccounting代写,专业代写accounting assignment
    Behavioral accounting has identified biases (such as framing effects) or cognitive
    constraints on information processing, and how these biases affect prices and audi-
    tor decisions (e.g., Maines and McDaniel 2000; Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson
    2002). Behavioral accounting has also devoted considerable effort to normative
    proposals for improving accounting rules and regulation (e.g., Kachelmeier and
    King 2002; Hodder, Koonce, and McAnally 2001).accounting代写,专业代写accounting assignment
    This is part of a common theme of practical observers, that investors are irra-
    tional and need to be protected from their own biases and from exploitation by
    firms or other professionals. With regard to mere error, behavioral economics and
    finance scholars have pursued the normative project of designing rules tailored to
    the capacities of individual investors or other naive players. Bad behaviors that
    have been targeted include plunging retirement savings into company stock and
    insufficient saving. With regard to exploitation, there is evidence of opportunistic
    reporting and disclosure behavior by firms to exploit cognitively constrained
    investors (see, e.g., Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998a, accounting代写,专业代写accounting assignmentb; Healy and Wahlen 1999),
    and theoretical analysis of how and why this occurs (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003).
    Our purposes here are different. Rather than performing normative analysis,
    we examine a positive issue: what explains the structure of existing^ccounting
    rules and regulation, and how it came about. An important example is the question:
    when does accounting policy and regulation provide good rather than bad rules for
    bad users? As pointed out by Waymire and Basu 2008, the normative research pro-
    gram tends to take for granted that once scholars evaluate alternative policies, the
    most desirable ones will be adopted. It is well understood that there is a problem of
    lobbying by special interests. However, there is also a problem that psychological
    bias can make bad rules seem appealing. Indeed, as discussed further below, the
    ability of special interest groups to succeed in lobbying efforts is probably a conse-
    quence of the limited attention and psychological biases of political participants.
    Bad rules